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CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE, PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY
Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan, and Kent Wayland*
INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long history of creating “public records” and viewing
at least some of these as an essential part of government accountability.1  Public
records minimize opportunities for secrecy which might shield the actions of elected
and appointed officials from public scrutiny.  Historically, decisions to require public
disclosure of information were made with particular limited purposes in mind: pur-
poses associated with the public or democratic value of the disclosure.2  Freedom
of Information Act requirements, at both the federal and state levels, further opened
access to government information and facilitated further disclosures of government
information.3  The Internet has exponentially escalated access to public records; infor-
mation posted on the Internet is effectively broadcasted to anyone in the world who
may be interested.  The interested viewers may have benign, nefarious or legitimate
reasons for being interested, and their interests may or may not be related to the original
purpose for making the information public.  Property tax records, professional licenses,
parking tickets, sex offender databases, court records, and campaign disclosure are
all good examples of such public records.4
As public records have been made available in computerized form and posted on
the Internet, public concerns about protecting the privacy of personally identifiable
information in these records have intensified.  Before computers and information
* The authors are, respectively, Anne Shirley Carter Olsson Professor of Applied Ethics,
School of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia; Professor, Department
of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University; Research Associate, School
of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia. William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal Symposium: Privacy, Democracy, and Elections, Williamsburg, Virginia, October 22,
2010. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Grant Number 0823363. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations ex-
pressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Science Foundation.
1 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 127, 133 (2004).
2 See, e.g. Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: The
“Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identifiable Information in
Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2–3 (2003) (“Congress recognized the
important need for citizens in a democracy to have access to government information in order
to participate in self-rule.”).
3 See id. at 9.
4 See id. passim.
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technology, those who wished to see and copy information in public records had to
traipse to a public building, request a record, wait for the staff to find it, carefully read
through the record to find the item(s) of interest, and then copy the desired information
manually.5  The physical presence and labor involved resulted in “practical obscurity,”6
that is, the work involved in obtaining access and duplicating information had the effect
of protecting the privacy of the information.  In the networked world, those built-in pro-
tections are removed and there is little or no obscurity.  Records can be easily accessed,
searched, analyzed, and reconstituted in new forms from nearly anywhere in the world. 
As early as 1989 in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, the Supreme Court recognized that “there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located
in a single clearinghouse of information.”7  In that decision, the court held that rap
sheets were not public information for the purposes of the Freedom of Information
Act, recognizing “the privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from the public
eye”8 and “the privacy interest in maintaining . . . [its] ‘practical obscurity.’”9
Public records or not, the ease of access to personal information made possible by
information technology and the Internet has resulted in what Joel Reidenberg refers
to as the “transparent citizen,”10 what Dan Solove terms the “digital person,”11 and
what Jeffrey Rosen sees as the “unwanted gaze.”12  Personally identifiable informa-
tion is somewhat up for grabs by those who have money, time, technological skills,
and motive.  Although the contours and implications of “information societies” have
been and continue to be identified, analyzed, and critiqued, the radical shift in what it
means for information to be in “public records” is often noted but less often analyzed.13 
An important implication of this shift is an intensification of the tension between pri-
vacy and transparency.  As Joel Reidenberg points out, the “scope of transparency and
the ease of re-purposing are a surprise to data subjects and the public at large.”14  A
5 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 131 (“For a long time, public records have been accessible
only in the various localities in which they were kept.”).
6 Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)
(internal quotations marks omitted).
7 Id. at 764.
8 Id. at 769.
9 Id. at 762.
10 Joel R. Reidenberg, The Transparent Citizen and the Rule of Law, Address Before the
Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Feb. 11, 2010), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interactive
/events/lawlab/2010/02/reidenberg.
11 SOLOVE, supra note 1.
12 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
(2000).
13 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 131–32 (observing that the “reality is rapidly
changing”).
14 Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 8.
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powerful example of this is the release of publicly available information about Justice
Scalia by Fordham law students.15  The new landscape of information accessibility and
flow calls into question whether the common good requires new principles, controls,
and regulation.16
Most of the debate and writing that addresses the conflict between privacy and
public records has centered on the issue of court records17 and the issue of community
notification laws for sex offenders, also called Megan’s Laws.18  Dan Solove notes that
courts can seal court records if the importance of confidentiality in a particular context
outweighs the need for public access;19 a trial court can permit a plaintiff to proceed
with the use of a pseudonym;20 and courts can permit anonymous juries.21  However,
most of these decisions about the privacy accorded in trials are at the judge’s dis-
cretion.22  In 2002, the National Center for State Courts and the Justice Management
Institute prepared draft guidelines for public access to court records, particularly in
light of technological innovations.23  They based their recommendations on the prin-
ciple that although a “general rule” for access should be the same “whether the Court
record is in paper or electronic form,” the nature of some information in court records
may mean that “remote public access to the information in electronic form may be
inappropriate.”24  This was then followed by publication of final guidelines, with par-
ticular attention to family court records, in 2005.25  State Megan’s Laws, which require
public disclosure of information about the location of convicted sex offenders after
15 E.g., Noam Cohen, Law Students Teach Scalia About Privacy and the Web, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2009, at B3 (explaining how Fordham law students were able to create a dossier about
Justice Scalia that included his home address and phone number, his wife’s personal e-mail
address, and his favorite TV shows and food from sources on the Internet).
16 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey
Rosen, 89 GEO. L. J. 2029, 2035 (2001) (observing the existence of “strong arguments against
placing limits on the collection and use of information” (emphasis omitted)).
17 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1157–60 (2002) (describing jurisprudence on access
to court records).
18 See, e.g., id. at 1148–49 (describing the reach of federal and state community notifi-
cation laws).




23 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & JUSTICE MGMT. INST., PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT
RECORDS: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT BY STATE COURTS (2002), available at
http://www.aija.org.au/tech3/program/presentations/slater/sjiGuide.pdf.
24 Id. at 1.
25 ALAN CARLSON & MARTHA WADE STEKETEE, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS:
IMPLEMENTING THE CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, at vii, 29–30 (2005), available at http://www
.jmijustice.org/publications/implementing-the-ccj-cosca-guidelines-on-public-access-to-court
-records/view.
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they have served their sentence, also raise questions about online access.  Some courts
allow wide public access, while others are more cautious.26
In general, as Hoefges points out, the policy discussions about balancing or recon-
ciling the importance of public disclosure with the protection of individual privacy
focus in large part on the purposes for which the information is likely to be used and
the consequences of such uses for the individuals named in the record.27  Indeed, the
question of subsequent uses of the personal information and the consequences for the
individuals involved are quite pertinent in all debates about public records.28  For ex-
ample, in a 1994 case the Supreme Court ruled that there was not a FOIA-related public
interest in disclosing federal employees’ home addresses to labor unions because such
disclosure did not reveal anything substantively related to official agency actions.29 
Critics have argued that the court’s approach has “allowed minimal privacy invasions
to tip the scales in favor of nondisclosure.”30  Nevertheless, this continues to be nego-
tiated depending on the context.  Drawing the line between the public interest in dis-
closure and the interest in privacy has proved to be a challenge.
Campaign finance disclosure (CFD) is an important domain in which electronic
reporting has aggravated the tension between privacy and transparency.  As a mech-
anism of accountability, CFD comes directly into conflict with privacy.  On the one
hand, because the secret ballot and associational privacy are at stake,31 there is a strong
case to be made for privacy.  On the other hand, the privacy interest is often not sup-
ported by constitutional or statutory law,32 and earlier Supreme Court rulings clearly
supported the principle that “individual privacy interests can be outweighed by public
interests that are served by government collection and use of personally-identifiable
data.”33  CFD is especially important here because the secret ballot and associational
privacy are not just individual privacy interests but are public goods essential to demo-
cratic governance.34  In other words, CFD may constitute one of the strongest cases
for privacy protection to trump disclosure.
26 See Solove, supra note 17, at 1183–84 (noting “courts are deeply divided about whether
to adhere to the secrecy paradigm”).
27 Hoefges et al., supra note 2, at 5.
28 See id. at 6–7 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding subsequent uses and
consequences).
29 Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994).
30 Hoefges et al., supra note 2, at 39.
31 See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 20–21 (2003) (arguing that such disclosure
“may cause concrete harms when others learn about an individual’s political convictions”).
32 See id. at 20–22 (“The Supreme Court has never clearly articulated an independent
constitutional right to information privacy.”).
33 Hoefges et al., supra note 2, at 53.
34 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21(3), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government . . . and shall be held by secret vote . . . .”).
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I. RATIONALE FOR PRIVACY IN VOTING
Privacy is an important but elusive concept that is arguably important in demo-
cratic government.  Julie Cohen, for example, sees a strong connection between in-
formation privacy, which promotes individual autonomy and self-development, and
vigorous public debate.35  Paul Schwartz also views information privacy as a condi-
tional requirement for deliberative democracy.36  Priscilla Regan argues that privacy
is not just an individual value but also a public value; it is important for democratic
political systems in being essential for the exercise of a number of First Amendment
rights, in establishing boundaries on the exercise of governmental power, and also in
enabling the development of some commonality among individuals, which is neces-
sary to unite a political community.37
However, in focusing here on CFD, the importance of privacy to democracy is
found in its connection to the right to vote.  The importance of privacy in the domain
of voting has been affirmed in a diverse set of court decisions that protect associational
privacy and diminish the amount of information voters must reveal in order to exer-
cise their right to vote.  Associational privacy is seen as essential for citizens to form
their opinions in an exploratory, unencumbered, tentative, non-punitive manner.38  In
NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which required the
NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of its members, ruling that there is a
“vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”39 
In 1993, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied somewhat similar logic in ruling
that the Virginia requirement that voters provide their Social Security number (SSN)
was unconstitutional because it forced people to risk public disclosure of the SSN in
order to vote.40  Virginia voter registration lists were required to be open to “public
inspection”41 which the plaintiff argued was an unconstitutional burden on his right to
vote.42  The court noted that the harm to an individual from the disclosure of a SSN
35 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–27 (2000).
36 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1651 (1999) (arguing that “absent strong rules for information privacy, Americans will hesitate
to engage in . . . activity likely to promote democratic self-rule”).
37 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 225–27 (1995) (“Privacy has value not just to individuals as individuals or
to all individuals in common but also to the democratic political system.”).
38 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“It is hardly a novel perception that
compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute a restraint
a freedom of association.”).
39 Id. at 462.
40 Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1355 (4th Cir. 1993).
41 There were restrictions on who could obtain copies of the lists and the purposes were
limited to those that were deemed election-related. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-406 (1950).
42 Greidinger, 988 F.2d at 1348.
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was “alarming and potentially financially ruinous.”43  The court ruled “that the funda-
mental right to vote was substantially burdened by the provision requiring public dis-
closure of the [SSN]” and that “there was no compelling state interest in [its] public
disclosure.”44  Virginia then passed a law preventing public inspection of SSN although
it was still collected by the state for voter registration purposes.45
Courts have recognized that the marketplace of ideas in which individuals form
their opinions, including those about political candidates, includes the right of speakers
to remain anonymous.  For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,46
the Court ruled that “[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”47  If speakers are entitled to
be anonymous in political expression, then one could argue by extension that voting
is a form of public expression as well, and should, therefore, be anonymous.  Indeed
voting has been protected by practice since the Australian ballot, which has been used
in the United States since the late nineteenth century.48  The rationale behind the secret
ballot is that one should not be open to retaliation or need to explain one’s vote; one’s
vote should be confidential, known in effect only to oneself.49  When women gained the
vote, it was noted that the secrecy of the ballot ensured that women would be voting
for themselves, not for their husbands.50
This is not to say that the courts or governments have not compromised in pro-
tecting the confidentiality of voting choice on the ballot.  States require individuals to
register to vote, and have made the registry a public record, as mentioned before in the
case involving disclosure of SSNs included in Virginia’s voter registry.51  Although
this may appear to be inconsistent with the secret ballot, voter registration signifies the
fact that one votes as a citizen, a public person if you will.
Voters do, then, have to reveal personal information in order to vote, but just what
information they have to reveal and how it is treated is a complicated matter.  Depend-
ing upon the state, the voter registry may reveal “one’s political party affiliation, date
of birth, place of birth, e-mail address, home address, telephone number, and some-
times one’s Social Security number.”52
43 Id. at 1354.
44 Robert Gellman, Public Records—Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A Discussion
Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q. 391, 404 (1995) (describing the holding from Greidinger).
45 Id.
46 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
47 Id. at 357.
48 ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES, 27–28 (1917).
49 See id. at 21–24.
50 See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL REFORM 1405 (William D. P. Bliss eds.,
London, Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1897).
51 Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1993).
52 Solove, supra note 17, at 1144 (internal citations omitted).
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Some states have restricted access to public record information, generally to ex-
clude access for the commercial uses of soliciting business or marketing services to
the public.  More than half of the states prohibit the commercial use of voter registra-
tion records.53  For example, “California [allows] voter registration lists [to] be released
to candidates, political committees, or for ‘election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or
governmental purposes.’”54  Florida allows or permits use of lists of registered voters
for purposes “related to elections, political or governmental activities, voter registration,
or law enforcement.”55  Similar restrictions apply to information about federal cam-
paign contributions.  The Federal Election Campaign Act states that reports of contri-
butors to political committees are “available for public inspection . . . except that any
information copied from such reports . . . may not be sold or used by any person for
the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes . . . .”56
The landscape of court decisions is complicated, though it indicates that the
importance of privacy in voting is well recognized in the law.  However, privacy pro-
tection is not ironclad.  There are many opportunities for privacy erosion, especially
at the state level.
II. RATIONALE FOR TRANSPARENCY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING
The idea of transparency in campaign financing is quite consistent with the
famous quote from James Madison’s letter to W.T. Barry:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps, both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: and a people who means to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowl-
edge gives.57
No other context is as important to democracy than elections to public office.  If
knowledge is to prevail over ignorance, then citizens must be informed about candi-
dates and campaigns.  From the early twentieth century, knowledge about who was
contributing to electoral campaigns has been framed as a way of ensuring fair and
open elections, addressing concerns about undue influence by the more economically
53 Philip N. Howard, Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media
in Political Campaign Strategy, 597 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 166 (2005).
54 Solove, supra note 17, at 1170 n.216 (quoting CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2) (West
2002)).
55 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.095(2) (West 2002)).
56 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 308(a)(4), 86 Stat. 3,
17 (1972) (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2006)).
57 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
966 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:959
advantaged and privileged individuals, and preventing corruption of the electoral
process.58  The 1910 Publicity Act required House campaign committees to disclose
contributors in excess of $100 within thirty days of an election;59 in 1911 this was ex-
tended to Senate candidates.60  The 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act required disclo-
sure in non-election years as well.61  The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
tightened requirements for campaign finance reporting and disclosure and also made
them applicable to primary elections.62  In 1974 FECA was amended to require “candi-
dates to file quarterly reports on their contributions and expenditures with the [Federal
Elections Commission (FEC)],”63 and made these records available to the public.64
The FEC is required to make these reports available to the public within forty-
eight hours of receipt.65  But, the law prohibits the sale or use of information from
these records for purposes of soliciting contributions, including political or charitable
contributions, and for any commercial purposes.66  The FEC regulations state that use
of FEC information in “newspapers, magazines, books, or similar communications is
permissible as long as the principal purpose . . . is not to communicate any contributor
information . . . [to] solicit[ ] contributions or for other commercial purposes.”67  In a
1992 case, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that these restrictions served “an important gov-
ernmental interest[ ] in reserving the value of the contributor list to the political com-
mittee that creates it.”68  It is worth noting that the proprietary interest of the campaign
organizations provided the motivation for the protection, not the privacy interests of
the contributors.69
In most of these laws, disclosure requirements were part of a larger package of con-
trols over campaign financing that also included some restrictions on both contributions
and expenditures.70  However, a landmark Supreme Court case in 1976 challenged the
constitutional viability of this three-pronged approach of contribution limitations,
expenditure restrictions and disclosure requirements by permitting limits on campaign
contributions as a way to reduce the reality or appearance of corruption in the political
58 For a short history of the campaign finance laws, see VICTORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS &
DIANA DWYRE, LIMITS AND LOOPHOLES: THE QUEST FOR MONEY, FREE SPEECH, AND FAIR
ELECTIONS 8–19 (2008).
59 Act of Jun. 25, 1910, ch. 392, § 6, 36 Stat. 822, 823.
60 Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 5, 37 Stat. 25, 25–27.
61 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, § 305(a), 43 Stat. 1053, 1070.
62 Id. at 11.
63 Id. at 11–12.
64 FARRAR-MYERS & DWYRE, supra note 58, at 12.
65 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2006).
66 Id.
67 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c) (2011).
68 FEC v. Int’l Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1001 (1992).
69 Gellman, supra note 44, 414.
70 See, e.g., Int’l Funding Inst., 969 F.2d at 1117.
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system and validating disclosure requirements,71 but invalidated limits on campaign
expenditures as an unconstitutional infringement of the candidate’s free speech.72  One
thrust of this ruling has been the creation of ways around the contributions restrictions,
often by finding loopholes that allow money to be funneled through different organi-
zations.73  Another thrust has been to elevate the importance of the disclosure require-
ments, which are clearly viewed as constitutional, as a means of tracking the myriad
routes that contributions can take.74
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance requirements and addressing the question of disclosure requirements
is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.75  With respect to disclosure, the
Court specifically noted:
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures
can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed
to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their posi-
tions and supporters.  Shareholders can determine whether their
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest
in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials
are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”76
The Court noted that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure requirements
“would be unconstitutional as applied to an organization if there were a reasonable
probability that the group’s members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if
their names were disclosed,”77 and that “the examples cited by amici [were] cause for
concern.”78  However, the Court concluded that Citizens United did not offer “evidence
that its members . . . face[d] similar threats or reprisals.”79
71 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976) (per curiam) (“The interest in alleviating the
corrupting influence of large contributions is served by . . . contribution limitations and
disclosure provisions . . . .”).
72 Id. at 58–59.
73 Id. at 252–53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (predicting “that the Court’s holding will invite
avoidance”).
74 Id. at 76.
75 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The Court, in an 8-1 ruling, held valid a statute requiring any
person that spends more than $10,000 in a year to produce or air an election ad covered by
federal restrictions must file a report with the Federal Election Commission disclosing the
names and addresses of anyone who contributed $10,000 or more to the ad’s preparation or
distribution. See id. at 914.
76 Id. at 905–06 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)).
77 Id. at 916.
78 Id. (“Some amici point to recent events in which donors to certain causes were black-
listed, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.”).
79 Id.
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Following the Court’s ruling, bills were introduced to expand and clarify disclo-
sure requirements, including the “Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act.”80  This Act includes a provision obligating
many advocacy organizations to release the identities of many of their donors, while
exempting organizations that have over 500,000 members, have received section 501(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code tax exemptions for the previous ten years, have a pres-
ence in all fifty states, and whose funding from corporations and unions is less than
fifteen percent.81  The ACLU and other opponents of this Act argue that the bill inequi-
tably suppresses only the speech of smaller organizations that might be more contro-
versial and compromises the anonymity of small donors.82  In a letter to the Senate, the
ACLU stated,“The DISCLOSE Act blurs the line between issue and campaign advo-
cacy and puts at risk of exposure the heretofore confidential donor records of millions
of Americans and thousands of legitimate non-profit advocacy organizations.”83  The
letter also states that “disclosure requirements should not have a chilling effect on the
exercise of rights of expression and association, especially in the case of controversial
political groups.”84
The debate over the DISCLOSE Act is illustrative of a broader concern that the
availability of public records online will lead to the transformation of activities designed
for one purpose into new forms of surveillance.  In the case of campaign finance, what
originated as a system of accountability based on the idea that transparency would
help to control inappropriate influence on political candidates, has turned into a system
of monitoring and targeting (i.e. surveillance) of campaign contributors.  In effect, the
lens of CFD has turned from campaigns and candidates to (include) donors.
III. TRANSPARENCY AS A HOUSE OF MIRRORS
The transformation that has occurred in CFD is in large part the result of moving
public records into an electronic medium.  When “public records” are constituted in
this medium, they can be used in ways that were practically impossible before.  Since
transparency involves, by definition, the revelation of information, the tension between
transparency and privacy arises regardless of medium.  However, this tension is exac-
erbated and reconfigured in an electronic medium.  The reconfiguration means that
in order to address the issues that arise and achieve an appropriate balance, an under-
standing of the nature of the electronic medium is essential.
80 Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act,
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
81 Id. § 211(c)(27).
82 See, e.g., Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director of the ACLU, to the United States
Senate (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Ltr_to_Senate_re_ACLU
_opposes_DISCLOSE_Act.pdf.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1.
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In what follows, we make use of a metaphor to conceptualize what happens when
public records are constituted in an electronic medium.  Again we focus on CFD as a
case illustrating how the tension between transparency and privacy is configured.  The
metaphor involves viewing the processes of developing accounts of campaigns, can-
didates, and donors as analogous to the activities that occur in a house of mirrors. 
The metaphor is a heuristic device used here to tease out (reveal) the myriad ways that
information is transformed and repurposed in the electronic medium.  Use of the meta-
phor suggests that we ought to be cautious in presuming that transparency is trans-
parent or in claiming that transparency in itself is a viable form of accountability for
democratic institutions.
What does it mean to say that the production of CFD accounts is analogous to
what goes on in a house of mirrors?  A house of mirrors is full of reflection, refrac-
tion, multiplication of images, and unpredictable perspectives; a person standing in
a house of mirrors sees aspects of their body seemingly distorted, that is, elongated,
shortened, exaggerated, and fragmented.  A house of mirrors is a complex of imagery,
with bouncing, highlighting, and shading of images that produce a surprising experi-
ence.  An individual sees an image of him or herself out of whack with their ordinary
sense of self.  Of course, the seeming distortion is far from random; it is the result of
the way the mirrors have been made, the placement of the mirrors in the architecture
of a building, the lighting, the way the house has “billed” (advertized) to the public,
and so on.  Houses of mirrors are created explicitly for fun—they are often referred
to as “fun houses.”
The design and architecture of a house of mirrors parallels the structures and
affordances of information technology and the Internet. Paper and ink data have very
different properties from electronic data posted on the Internet.  Playing out the meta-
phor of a house of mirrors, at least four processes can be identified in the production
of Internet instrumented information systems: entry, bouncing, highlighting and shad-
ing, and rendering.  The outcome of these processes—the rendering—is an account (or
accounts) delivered in the name of transparency, though highly processed and infused
with normative assumptions and values.
A. Entry
When a person enters a house of mirrors, a reflection of the person is constituted
in a mirror (or mirrors).  Similarly, when someone donates to a campaign (in effect
entering the CFD system), the campaign creates a record.85  This initial record-creation
is done in response to, and in accordance with, legal requirements.  The legal require-
ments specify what personal information donors must supply86 and the system is set
up so that one cannot donate unless one provides this information.87  Campaigns are
85 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (2006) (setting forth the FEC’s reporting requirements).
86 Id. § 434(b) (setting forth the content required to be disclosed in FEC reports).
87 Id.
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required to gather, record, and submit this information to the FEC.88  Unlike a house
of mirrors in which entry is typically accompanied by a reflection seen by the en-
trant, donors do not immediately “see” the record created in the campaign data base. 
Nevertheless, one has been created and will, in a short period of time, be posted on the
Internet.89  Interestingly, the image created in CFD is instantaneously multiplied in
the sense that the donation is seen as a reflection both of the campaign and the donor.
Donors are required to supply their name, employer, occupation, home address,
and the amount donated.90  In this respect, the reflection of the donor and campaign
is selective and limited.  It is a reduction of the person.  In requiring certain informa-
tion and not other information, CFD law singles out certain aspects of donors that are
deemed relevant.  The information provided doesn’t reveal a donor’s motivation in
contributing to the campaign; it doesn’t tell the percentage of the person’s total wealth
that is donated; it doesn’t disclose the person’s age, gender, or party affiliation.  The
required items might be thought of as establishing a donor’s identity vis-a-vis CFD. 
Importantly, the required items have not been arbitrarily selected.
Particular information is required because of a set of assumptions that are made
in CFD law about human nature, interests, and corruption.  For example, the assump-
tion seems to be that individuals with particular occupations have interests and might
use money to try to influence campaigns to serve their interests.91  Similarly, the re-
quirement that one supply one’s name and address seems to assume that individuals
may want to hide their identity; hence their identity must be established.92  In American
democracy, some forms of influence are legitimate and others not.  Embedded in these
required elements are norms about “what matters” in political campaigns and what con-
stitutes political corruption.  Contributions from members of certain occupations and
contributions of a certain size are somehow linked to inappropriate influence or influ-
ence that is relevant to the public (voters).  This potentially inappropriate influence will,
presumably, be counterbalanced if voters are able to see what the influences might be.
So, while the record created upon entering the CFD system is a reduction, it is a
selective reduction based on assumptions about what is relevant and what is not for the
purposes of accountability and fair elections.  The parallel to a house of mirrors is with
the architecture of the house which has been set up to produce oddly configured and
fanciful reflections.  Indeed, the parallel between the multiple, rearranged reflections
produced in the house of mirrors and the selected and ordered display of information
about donors in the CFD system captures some of the uncontrollability of information
posted on the Internet.  The campaign gathers data about its donors so as to produce an
88 Id. § 434(a).
89 Id. § 434(d)(2) (requiring documents to be made “accessible to be the public on the
internet not later than 24 hours after the document is received by the Commission”).
90 See id. §§ 431(13), 432(c).
91 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Should Campaign Donors Be Identified?, REGULATION, Summer
2001, at 12–14, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n2/ayres.pdf.
92 Id.
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account of the campaign but the account reflects the donors.93  In effect, the reflection
is doubled.
B. Bouncing
In a house of mirrors, a person’s (mirror-constituted) reflection moves from sur-
face to surface, perhaps down hallways, into unseen corners and even into different,
unrelated portions of the house.  The reflection multiplies and each replication is an
opportunity for additional contortion of the reflection; each replication is an opportunity
for surprise.  Once a record of a donation has been created by a campaign, merged with
other information, and posted on the Web by the FEC, it can be, and often is, bounced
from one location to another where it may reveal new aspects.94  Donor/ campaign data
can be copied, mined, and reposted endlessly.95  It can move to unexpected places,
with unpredicted results. The global scope of potential bouncing parallels the infinite
regress of mirrors reflecting other mirrors.
In CFD, since the information is posted on public web sites,96 data on individual
donations bounce from the databases of the campaign to those of regulators to those
of watchdog groups, journalists, law enforcement, neighbors, family and friends.97 
In this we see some of the primary affordances of information technology and the
Internet.98  At each of these places, the data can be easily and almost perfectly repli-
cated and transmitted.  Journalists, watchdog groups, other data repositories and even
citizens can download subsets of the data or the entirety.99  The data can be searched
93 For example, Internet access to campaign donors is readily available on the FEC’s web-
site, searchable by contributor’s name, city, state, zip code, business, date, and amount. See
Disclosure Data Search, FED. ELECTIONS COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/
disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
94 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(12) (2006) (allowing the FEC “to post . . . information on the
Internet immediately upon receipt”); see also McGeveran, supra note 31, at 12 (“After the
government makes this [political contribution] information conveniently available, private
entities and the news media disseminate it further. Various independent advocacy groups use
disclosure data to create sophisticated online databases of individual contributors.”).
95 McGeveran, supra note 31, at 13 (“Th[e] combination of campaign finance disclosure
law, government administrative practices, and new technology makes information about indi-
vidual political contributions much more widely and easily available . . . .”).
96 See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(11)(b) (establishing standards to mandate disclosure of contri-
butions on the internet to be made publicly accessible within forty-eight hours).
97 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98 For a discussion of how information technology over the Internet provides wide pub-
licity, see Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked
Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 124–26, 137–38
(David Buckingham ed., 2008) (arguing that the rise of the Internet and social network sites
are “networked publics” that support sociability and “searchability”).
99 See McGeveran, supra note 31, at 11 (“Dramatically increased computerization has
created digitized archives of personal data that are larger, more publicly accessible, and more
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quickly,100 and it can also be mined for relationships that might not be immediately
apparent.101  People can search within their neighborhood to find what their neigh-
bors are doing.102  Campaigns and political consultants can link the donation databases
to other databases to better target fund-raising and advertising.103  The dynamic and
networked nature of the Internet means that the data can quickly be exposed to large
audiences.  And, the data persist in Web-linked databases, ever ready to be recalled
when a person searches for them, ever ready to be mined or manipulated in new ways.
This movement from place to place (bouncing) is beyond the control of the person
the data are about.  Although not intended in the legislation creating CFD, the donor’s
loss of control of personal data is now “the price one pays” for making a donation. 
The price can be very high.  Consider the 2008 California ballot initiative known as
Proposition 8.  It sought to ban gay marriage, and many groups poured resources into
advertising for or against this controversial measure.  Soon after it was passed, oppo-
nents of the ban, outraged with the result, sought to find out how campaign for the ban
had succeeded.  Thanks to state campaign finance laws, they were able to develop a
robust database of people who funded the initiative’s passage.104  An enterprising and
anonymous programmer mashed up the names and geographic locations of the donors
with Google maps, producing www.eightmaps.com, a site where any visitor could see
who in what neighborhoods contributed to the campaign.105  As a result many individual
supporters were targeted with insults, threats and boycotts.106  Certainly those indi-
viduals never imagined that the result of their donation would be personal harassment
on the apparent assumption that they were anti-gay zealots.  This is one of the most
salient illustrations of how a transparency system can turn into a surveillance system.
easily searched and analyzed than ever before. In the last five years, campaign contribution dis-
closure suddenly joined the trend of online compilation and availability.” (internal footnotes
omitted)).
100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 93, 99 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Voter Profiles Selling Briskly as Privacy Issues are Raised, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at A1 (reporting on Aristotle International, a company with the nation’s
largest voter data bank that provides detailed profiles of voters and sells them to politicians,
as “one of the first companies to fully exploit the use of technology in the political system”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2006) (prohibiting the sale
or use of any information reported to the FEC for the purpose of “soliciting contributions or
for commercial purposes”).
104 See Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at B3 (arguing that Eightmaps.com, a website that overlays personal
data of Proposition 8 donors on a Google map, “is the latest, most striking example of how
information collected through disclosure laws . . . may be undermining the democratic values
that the regulations were to promote”).
105 Id.; see also PROP 8 MAPS, http://www.eightmaps.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (with
text accompanying map: “Proposition 8 changed the California state constitution to prohibit
same-sex marriage. These are the people who donated in order to pass it.”).
106 Id.
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In a house of mirrors the bouncing of images is intentionally designed to create
fun.  Explaining why donor data move so freely on the Internet is more complicated. 
The CFD system was created to make campaigns accountable and not intended to
create public surveillance of donors.107  Why, then, has this happened?  Part of the
story must be simply the affordances of the Internet, but why hasn’t this affordance
been constrained?  Why, that is, has the situation been tolerated? Here we speculate
that the free movement of donor data aligns with normative assumptions about the
value and importance of transparency.  In other words, on the face of it, transparency
of donors may be seen as a good thing.  It may also have been seen, as suggested
earlier, as the price one has to pay for transparency of campaigns.  In any case, to
move now in the direction of hiding donor data involves stepping over a hurdle that
was not exactly or intentionally placed.  The hurdle to hiding donor data seems to have
been an unintended consequence of the switch to an electronic medium.
C. Highlighting and Shading
The reflection that one sees in a house of mirrors highlights and shades various
aspects of a person’s body.  As can be seen in the case of the California ballot initia-
tive, as reflections of persons are bounced from place to place and re-contextualized
and repurposed, various aspects of a person are highlighted and shaded.  The high-
lighting and shading results from the nature of the electronic environment as well as
from the contexts and purposes in which the data are used.  As such, the highlighting
and shading are unpredictable.  Not only is an individual not in control of how their
data are used, it is not possible to predict how, in fact, the data will be used.
The highlighting and shading can be illustrated with a simple example.  If one
searches on Google for “Kent Wayland” (one of the authors of this paper), one of
the top results links to a database available at the Huffington Post, an online news-
paper, where users may browse campaign donations with specially designed Web
tools, by name, zip code, date of donation, campaign season, etc.108  The database
further displays recent political donations, downloaded from the FEC, repackaged
and subject to indexing by Google’s Web crawler.109  Although Wayland’s political
activity and campaign donations are relatively minor, they make up a significant com-
ponent of his online identity due to the high ranking Google gives these search results. 
Information on Wayland’s contributions is not just bounced from site to site; his
contributions become a highlighted aspect of his Web presence because of the com-
bination of the way Google works, the Huffington Post’s popularity, and Wayland’s
other (in)activity: Wayland’s name is not especially common, his Web presence is not
107 See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 286
(2010).
108 Huffpost Fundrace Results, HUFFINGTON POST, http://fundrace.huffingtonpost.com/
neighbors.php?type=name&lname=wayland&fname=kent (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
109 Id.
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especially extensive, and the Huffington Post is recognized by Google’s search engine
as an especially popular site.  This illustrates how the architecture of the Internet may
shape a person’s identity in a unpredictable way.
The press and reporters routinely scour disclosures for lines of influence and
suggestions of a candidate’s political leanings. Watchdog groups, too, pore over CFD
information for threats to the public interest, or whatever other interest they are protect-
ing.110  Opposing candidates and opposition researchers scrutinize donor lists for any
hint of scandal tied to individual donors—corrupt businessmen, perhaps, or ineligible
donors.111  Opponents may look for classes of donors, such as trial lawyers, health care
organizations, or oil companies, who could shape or fit into a critical narrative about
the candidate.  In some cases, especially in major national races, a candidate may be
forced to publicly denounce ill-fated acquaintances formed largely for financial expe-
dience.  Such was the case in the 2007 U.S. presidential primaries, when then-candidate
Hillary Rodham Clinton decided to return $850,000 in funds raised for her campaign
by the Democratic operative Norman Hsu, a con man charged and later convicted in
a pyramid scheme that bilked investors out of $20 million.112  Senator Clinton claimed
she wasn’t aware of Hsu’s crimes but continues to face scrutiny regarding her relation-
ship to him.113
In a house of mirrors, the mirrors may have been designed and positioned to elon-
gate your legs reconfiguring them out of proportion or to change the shape of your head
so that you are all eyes.  Something parallel happens in CFD.  Initially in CFD systems
attention is drawn to the five required elements of one’s identity, and when these items
are posted on the Internet, they are combined and processed with other data, and put
in contexts that highlight and shade aspects of a person of which that even the person
may be unaware.
D. Rendering of Accounts
When a person exits a house of mirrors, the reflections, bouncing, highlighting
and shading stops, though the person may well be left with a new perspective on him-
self or herself.  The individual may remember a series of these images or a concate-
nation of images that make her see herself differently.
110 E.g., McGeveran, supra note 31, at 12–13.
111 E.g., id. at 12–13, 29; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1975) (per curiam)
(“[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption
by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”).
112 Benjamin Weiser, Democratic Fund-Raiser Gets 24-Year Term for Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2009, at A28.
113 John Solomon et al., Clinton Campaign Cites Flawed Background Check: No Evidence
of Fundraiser’s Lawsuit or Bankruptcy Turned Up in Records Search, Spokesman Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2007, at A3; Peter Flaherty, Hsu Convicted But No Reckoning for Hillary,
NAT’L LEGAL & POL’Y CTR. (May 20, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://nlpc.org/stories/2009/05/20/hsu
-convicted-no-reckoning-hillary.
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In the CFD what results is not a memory of one’s distorted body, but an
account—usually many accounts—that has been rendered from the initial reflection
(information gathered) being bounced, combined with other data, and highlighted and
shaded. “Render” here carries the connotation of something (someone) being taken
apart and then transformed into something different.  The rendering(s) might be likened
to a cubist or surrealist portrait of a person.  Features are selected, multiplied, moved
around, highlighted, and shaded.  Features of a person are reconfigured into a portrait. 
Of course it is more accurate to say that features of a person may be reconfigured into
multiple portraits.  Because data is bounced around and repurposed, many different
accounts may be rendered, accounts developed by many different actors with many
different interests—journalists, campaigns, opposition candidates and campaigns,
political parties, interest groups, regulators, etc.
As with the personal data elements required for donations in CFD and the
highlighting and shading, rendering often draws on a normative landscape involving
assumptions about human behavior and political processes.  In the case of Proposi-
tion 8 in California, it would seem that data about donors supporting Proposition 8
were used with the assumption that donating to this cause was an affirmative act of
resisting gay marriage.114  The combination rendered donors as homophobic, anti-gay
people who deserve scorn or even retaliation.115
Drawing on another situation involving contributions to Hillary Clinton’s cam-
paign to become the Democratic candidate for the U.S. President, data about donors
was used to render Clinton a shady (if not corrupt) politician.116  The rendering was
produced by combining information about large contributions with the assumption
that money is the prime influence on politicians.117  Lessig explains that as First Lady,
Clinton opposed a bankruptcy bill with provisions that were friendly to credit card com-
panies, and she, presumably, convinced her husband to oppose it too.118  President
Clinton refused to sign the bill as passed in both houses of Congress, allowing it to
fail in a pocket veto.119  After she was elected as a senator from New York, Clinton
seemingly switched her position, twice voting in favor of the bankruptcy measure,120
114 See Second Amended Complaint, ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 2:09-00058-MCE-DAD).
115 See id.; David Lourie, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After Proposition 8 Campaign,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 148 (2009).
116 See, e.g., Cliff Montgomery, Senator Clinton, House Democrats Sever Ties to Shady
Donor, AM. SPARK (Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.americanspark.com/2007/08-30-07_Dems
-return-cash.html (stating that Hsu’s “run-ins with the law . . . [were] beginning to be a
public embarrassment”).
117 See Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency: The Perils of Openness in Government,
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though ultimately opposing its final passage.121  Critics decried this maneuvering,
attributing Senator Clinton’s change in stance to the $140,000 she had received in cam-
paign contributions from the finance industry while running for office.122  This narrative
of Clinton’s decisions to support and not support legislation is produced by presum-
ing the power of money to influence.  Of course, other assumptions could have been
made.  For example, in representing the state of New York, one might argue that she
had a special duty to support the bill.123  Instead, as Lessig notes, “Everyone learning
the fact [of her funding] now ‘knows’ just why she switched, don’t they?  Whether true
or not, money is the reason for the switch in this case.”124  In other words, the contro-
versy over Hillary Clinton’s change in position hinged on the fundamental assump-
tion built into CFD—that money is the prime mover of politics.125  Combined with this
assumption, campaign finance data render candidates in a particular way.
Rendering might be thought of as the final step in CFD, so it is important to note
that a rendering—an account of a person—can easily become the entry step of another
run through the house of mirrors.  Accounts of persons endure when posted on the
Internet and at any point information in an account can be taken up for a new purpose,
combined with other data, and used to produce a new rendering.  Moreover, unlike the
images of a real house of mirrors, the effects of CFD accounts are far from comic;
they can be profound and enduring.  There may, in fact, be no exit from this house of
mirrors because the data persist, ever-ready for the production of new renderings.
IV. DISCUSSION/POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Practical obscurity, as described earlier, has been lost as a result of the electronic
environment.  CFD has been reconfigured from essentially a system of transparency
holding candidates and campaigns accountable to practically a system that enables
surveillance of donors.  This can be seen in the case of the “donor lookup” feature
found on OpenSecrets, a website of the Center for Responsive Politics.126  The mission
of the Center is a laudable one:
The Center for Responsive Politics is the nation’s premier research
group tracking money in U.S. politics and its effect on elections
and public policy.  Nonpartisan, independent and nonprofit, the
organization aims to create a more educated voter, an involved
citizenry and a more transparent and responsive government.  In






126 Donor Lookup: Find Individual and Soft Money Contributions, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/indivs/index.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
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• Inform citizens about how money in politics affects
their lives
• Empower voters and activists by providing unbiased
information
• Advocate for a transparent and responsive govern-
ment
We pursue our mission largely through our award-winning web-
site, OpenSecrets.org, which is the most comprehensive resource
for federal campaign contributions, lobbying data and analysis
available anywhere.  And for other organizations and news media,
the Center’s exclusive data powers their online features tracking
money in politics—counting cash to make change.127
No mention is made—no concern is expressed—about the importance of the First
Amendment privacy interests in association and opinion formation, or of the long
cherished value of the secret ballot, or of donors’ lack of expectation that their infor-
mation is broadcast to the world.128  Instead, the assumption seems to be simply that
information about donors will inform and empower.  In other words, transparency is
seen as an unqualified “good.”  But, as we have argued above, this is not the case.
The house of mirrors analysis shows that transparency is far from a simple matter,
let alone an unqualified good.  Transparency systems do not simply reveal “what is
there” or merely put light on what otherwise takes place in the dark.  Transparency
involves “making” anew and creating new opportunities.  An account of someone
or some activity is produced, and the production—the rendering—is shaped by the
medium in which the account is produced as well as a myriad of other factors, includ-
ing the interpreted understanding of the activity being made transparent and tradeoffs
between values.  The medium and the normative landscape of assumptions and values
in which transparency is produced must be taken into account in using transparency
as a mechanism of accountability.
Acknowledging that transparency is a house of mirrors when implemented on the
Internet is the first step to better balancing the tension between transparency and pri-
vacy in CFD.  What are the next steps?  What else does the house of mirrors metaphor
tell us about how to better address and balance this tension in an electronic environ-
ment?  In the house of mirrors metaphor, the question is: how can the mirrors be re-
positioned to achieve a desirable form of transparency without threatening the privacy
of the voter?  Is there a way to minimize the amount of light being focused on donors
while at the same time keep the light appropriately focused on campaigns?
Lawrence Lessig argues that we should abandon the current system and adopt
an entirely different model of campaign funding, one that is publicly financed and,
127 Our Mission: Inform, Empower & Advocate, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://
www.opensecrets.org/about/index.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (emphasis omitted).
128 See id.
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therefore, does not require information about donors or donations.129  Daniel Solove,
on the other hand, argues that some limitations on access and uses of public informa-
tion may create “a workable compromise for the tension between transparency and
privacy . . . .”130  We agree in part with Solove but more is needed than limitations on
access and use.  To turn to public financing of campaigns or to merely change pat-
terns of access and use is, in effect, to presume that the current setup is the only way
CFD can be implemented on the Internet.  This is not the case.  Indeed, the house of
mirrors analysis identifies a set of points at which the mirrors can be repositioned. 
Each of the aspects of the house of mirrors described above—entry, bouncing, high-
lighting, shading, and rendering—can be examined in terms of their role and effects
on privacy and transparency.  Each is a potential “lever point” for achieving a better
balance of privacy and transparency in CFD (and by example in other cases).
In what follows we identify a set of possible strategies, but our aim is not to argue
for a particular strategy—but only to identify the possibilities in light of our under-
standing of transparency and how it comes into tension with privacy in an electronic
environment.  Each of the processes in the house of mirrors constitutes a point at which
some tinkering may redress the thrust towards transparency and afford more protection
for privacy.  Since this approach involves revisiting how transparency and privacy are
constituted in CFD implementation on the Internet, the guiding principles must be the
rationales for having transparency and for protecting privacy.  In other words, we must
keep in mind: 1) that privacy in forming opinions about candidates and campaigns
should be unencumbered (there should be no fear of sanctions for engaging in speech
that helps to understand candidates and campaigns) and the secrecy of the vote should
be maintained; and 2) that campaigns and candidates should be held accountable for
running campaigns that do not undermine democratic processes, and should be honest
about who they are.
A. Entry
We begin our analysis with the entry into the CFD house of mirrors.  At this point,
information is collected.  Currently, as noted above, CFD requires name, employer,
occupation, home address, and the amount donated.131
There are at least two issues that need to be revisited here.  The first is what items
of information should be collected, and second, what information must be displayed
129 Lessig, supra note 117, at 8. Somewhat similarly, Ian Ayres suggests that candidates
establish a blind trust to fund their campaigns with donors contributing directly to the trust,
and their donations remaining anonymous both to the public and to the campaign itself. Ian
Ayres, Disclosure versus Anonymity in Campaign Finance, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS 19, 19–54 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). In this case, the reflection
does not bounce to the campaign and elected officials cannot reward their patrons, removing
the possibility of corruption. Id. at 28, 33.
130 Solove, supra note 17, at 1195.
131 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006).
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in order to achieve the accountability aimed for by the system, and to retain a level of
practical obscurity appropriate to the context.
The issue of what items are collected should be determined by the purpose or pur-
poses to be achieved by the system.  Some of the current data elements can be modi-
fied or eliminated without compromising the value of keeping candidates accountable. 
“Name” and “amount donated” would appear to be necessary for the system to operate
but others are less critical.  For example, “employer” is regarded as important because
then the public can ascertain if several employees are contributing to a particular candi-
date, which may indicate that an employer has a special interest that could be pro-
moted or furthered by the candidate.  But one’s occupation may not be necessary, as
even if all college professors or doctors were to donate to a particular candidate the
possible interest in the candidate would be so diffuse to be somewhat meaningless. 
“Home address” provides relevant information on whether a donor is eligible to vote
for a candidate but provides more precise information than is needed.  Instead, one’s
congressional district alone should suffice.  Alternatively, entry to the CFD system
could be designed as a two-step process where identifying information was altered in
such a way that its meaning could be retained but not the specifics.  This would entail
developing anonymizing techniques that conveyed categories deemed relevant to CFD
but not identifying information.
The question of what information should be displayed entails the balancing be-
tween transparency and privacy.  Information about amount donated is currently dis-
played as the exact amount a donor gives, but for purposes of accountability as well
as privacy, the amounts could be reported as ranges or categories, e.g., $1–$500,
$1,000–$3,000, etc.132  Similarly, one’s full name need not be posted; instead, a first
initial and last name may suffice for purposes of accountability as well as providing
some privacy.  This would mean in effect, the creation of a form of practical obscurity
in that someone who wished to use the data for transparency or surveillance purposes
would need to exert additional effort to determine who a donor actually is.
What we are suggesting here is that we revisit the decision about what data needs
to be collected when a donation is made in light of the fact that the data will be posted
on the Internet.  Although arguments can be made for the value of collecting each
item of information, it doesn’t follow that all items have to be posted or posted in the
form collected.
The five items currently collected are collected for multiple purposes and these
purposes were not taken into account when the CFD system went on the Internet.133 
Some information seems to be collected to ensure that the donation comes from a
legitimate donor, i.e., name and address.134  Some information seems to be collected
132 Id.
133 See McGeveran, supra note 31, at 11–12 (explaining that “change in technology quali-
tatively transformed the nature of disclosure laws” such that “law[s] may remain the same, but
[their] effect is entirely different”).
134 See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 100–01, 107 (2010).
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because it reveals something relevant to appropriate/inappropriate influence, e.g., size
of donation and employer.135  The question that has to be raised here is which informa-
tion is relevant for accountability, which to detect corruption, and which for citizens to
evaluate the candidate.  Perhaps some will argue that it is better to err on the side of
making all information public rather than using a particular theory of corruption.  On
the other hand, information relevant for making sure the donor is a real person seems
very different from information relevant to figure out influence.
B. Bouncing
The lever points in CFD are inextricably intertwined, so a change in entry infor-
mation will automatically affect bouncing.  If the information fields are modified, dif-
ferent information will be bounced around.  Indeed, if one assumes that the Internet
is free and open and uncontrollable (i.e., that bouncing is an inherent feature of the
Internet), then the only way to control bouncing is to control the information posted. 
However, information posted on the Internet can be restricted even when it is pub-
licly accessible.  At least two possibilities are readily apparent.  One is the use of the
“read-only” format and the other is control of searching capabilities.  A different
balance of transparency and privacy (than we currently have) would be achieved by
making CFD records posted on the Internet “read-only.”  The records would then be
accessible from the FEC website to anyone who wanted to see them, but could not
be easily downloaded or copied and pasted elsewhere.136  To be sure, individuals and
organizations could find ways to “get” and manipulate the information, but they
could do so only with some difficulty, e.g., copying and re-entering, using special
technological tools.  The “read-only” status would produce (and reintroduce) some
element of “practical obscurity.”137
Another possibility is to manipulate or eliminate the search functions for CFD
data.  By using various tagging systems or regulating search engine companies, CFD
data might be posted so that those searching for it would be directed primarily to the
original FEC site.  It could also be designed so that people would need to read through
the data rather than automatically “finding” information of particular interest.  In effect,
“data mining” capabilities could be turned off or restricted.  None of these technical
measures would guarantee that CFD data would never be duplicated, re-presented, or
mined.  Rather these technical measures create a form of practical obscurity.  In effect,
they constrain bouncing by putting up hurdles.
Lawrence Lessig’s insight in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace is relevant here
in that achieving a desirable balance of transparency and privacy is likely to involve
135 McGeveran, supra note 31, at 29.
136 See id. at 12 (discussing the current accessibility of information of the FEC website).
137 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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some combination of law, architecture, norms, and markets.138  The technical measures
just mentioned—“read-only” documents and restricted searching functions—could be
supported by legislation that penalized those who manipulated and mined CFD data.
C. Highlighting and Shading
Architectural changes in entry and bouncing change the architecture for highlight-
ing and shading; if we bring in a normative landscape as a component of highlighting
and shading, it will return us to entry and what theories about corruption and influence
are at work in the choice of five items.
Just as changing the entry information automatically affects bouncing, changes
in entry information and bouncing together affect highlighting and shading.  Privacy
protections at entry and bouncing will serve to restrict highlighting and shading.  But
more to protect donor privacy can also be done at this stage.
Highlighting and shading are the result of many factors but the starting place is
generally a combination of repurposing and manipulation.  Information about donors
is mined for correlations.139  The data are disaggregated and then re-aggregated and
repackaged for purposes quite different than those for which they were collected. 
Remember that in the case of California’s ballot initiative for Proposition 8, data col-
lected in the name of the transparency of the campaign was combined with location
data and then repurposed to targeting of donors.140  Repurposing of data is constrained
by the limitations mentioned under bouncing.  But if the architecture of the system
can be designed so that information fields are tied together, then it will be more diffi-
cult, if not practically impossible, to highlight and shade elements of the information. 
For example, if the possibilities for sorting of posted data are architecturally con-
strained, then again a hurdle is introduced that makes difficult for certain kinds of
matching to occur.  Another option is that data be displayed so that it cannot be com-
bined with data in other systems because the system in which CFD is displayed is not
interoperable with other systems.  Again, this does not eliminate data matching but
creates practical obscurity.
D. Rendering
In large measure, rendering is the outcome of the prior three processes.  Changes
in entry, bouncing, and highlighting/shading lead to changes in the kinds of accounts
(of campaigns, candidates, and donors) that can be rendered.  Rendering in unintended
ways would be more difficult if the above protections are put in place.
138 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 186–87 (1999) (discuss-
ing the need to strike a “balance between individual and collective rights . . . and the implicit
regulations of the architectures of cyberspace”).
139 See McGeveran, supra note 31, at 12–13.
140 E.g., Noveck, supra note 134, at 99.
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In addition, there are some measures that might be targeted specifically to make
unintended rendering more practically difficult.  For example, expunging campaign
finance data after a limited period of time, say two years after an election, would con-
strain the possibility of long-term accounts of donors which are unnecessary for pur-
poses of candidate and campaign accountability.  For this to be effective, it might
necessitate “self-destruct” codes built into the CFD data.  The self-destruct code would
transfer so that every time data is copied, the self-destruct code is automatically copied.
CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the beginning of the last section, our aim is not to argue for any
particular change but rather to emphasize that there are a range of possibilities.  Our
aim is to open the black box of the current CFD system and show that it is not the only
way it has to be.141  In hindsight it seems that moving CFD records to the Internet
might have been done (naively) under the (blind) assumption that “public records”
must mean making all possible information available to everyone who is interested. 
Of course, this concept of “public records” is misleading if not inchoate.  Selective data
is collected.  And, information posted is not simply posted; it is manipulated, mined,
and interpreted.  The selection of data is made on the basis of a set of purposes insep-
arable from ideas about what counts as corruption, how politicians may be influenced,
what donors seek, and so on.  Currently, posting data does not simply mean making it
available to citizens; it means making it available to those who manipulate it and repost
it for a variety of purposes.  The reality of information posted on the Internet should be
brought together with a new concept of what “public records” should mean.  The new
concept should take into account the nature of the Internet and the value of privacy
alongside the value of transparency.
Most of the changes we have identified as a result of the house of mirrors analy-
sis focus on the architectural components of CFD, the primary area of our concern. 
However, we recognize that for these changes to be effective, as well as for other
complementary changes to be incorporated, a more complete analysis of how archi-
tecture works with law and social norms is necessary.  In this case, that would entail,
at the least, an investigation into the implementation practices of the Federal Election
Commission and a fuller understanding of cultural and political theories of corruption.
141 Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social
Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology, 18 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 362,
365 (1993) (arguing that humanitarians and social science writers should not “look[ ] upon
technological developments as black boxes” but instead “open[ ] the black box” as “social
constructivists”).
